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1.0 SUMMARY
This report presents a potential problem - the associated operational concerns
and preliminary solution alternatives related to elevating the inertial upper
stage/tracking and data relay satellite (IUS/TDRS) w,itn a failed Orbiter vernier
reaction control system (VRCS). Thl.s problem arises from the combination of
TDRS thermal constraints and tilt tabla constraints (the primary reaction con-
trol system (PACS) cannot be used to hold attitude while the tilt table is being
elevated), and the problem is compounded by the minimum PRCS attitude deadband.
The potential solution options appear to affect and/or be affected by the launch
window, flight profile, crew procedures, vehicle (IUS, TDRS, Orbiter) capability
and constraints, flight rules, etc.; therefore, if the solution to this problem
is to be anything other than to abort the mission, it appears that the selection
of the implementation method cannot be made unilaterally but will require the
consensus of all elements.
The preliminary assessment and evaluation as described in this document was made
within the present knowledge and visibility of the author. It is acknowledged
that some facts used in this assessment may not be current; that other considera-
tions and information, of which the author is unaware, may exist that signifi-
cantly affect they magnitude of the problem and/or the conclusions drawn; and fi-
nally, that other (and better) solutions may exist. Therefore, comments and
inputs are solicited. Questions related to this document should be referred to
Jerome Bell, mail code FM2, extension 4346.
2.0 INTRODUCTION
Current Space Transportation System (STS) guidelines appear to be directed to-
wards designing deployable payloads to be compatible with the PRCS operation in
the event of a failure of the nonredundant VRCS. This capability, then, would
not preclude mission success in the event of the single-point VRCS failure; to
this end, previous and present flight planning activities have provided for VRCS
failure contingency in the propellant budget. With respect to the TDRS/IUS
(STS-5), such a failure also has a potential timeline impact when considered in
relation to the TDRS/IUS current understood design constraints and the opera-
tional timeline developed to date. The purpose of this document is to identify
potential problems associated with tilt-table elevation in case of VRCS failure,
potential impacts to the present STS-5 timeline, and options for flight design
solution.
w
3.0 SYMBOLS AND ACRONYMS
ASE	 airborne support equipment
AGO	 Santiago Ground Station
AOS	 acquisition of signal
CIR	 cargo integration review
d W
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GET ground elapsed time
GMT Greenwich mean time
GMTLO Greenwich mean time of lift-off
GN&C guidance, navigation, and control
GSTDN ground spaceflight tracking and data network
IOS Indian Ocean Ground Station
IUS inertial upper stage
LOS loss-of-signal
MPAD Mission Planning and Analysis Division
PI payload integrator
PIP payload integration plan
PRCS primary reaction control, system
RF radio frequency
RTS remote tracking site
SRM solid rocket motor
STDN spaceflight tracking and data network
STS Space Transportation System
TDRS-A tracking and data relay satellite - first flight
VRCS vernier reaction control system
ZLV Z local vertical, payload bay along radius vector toward
center of Earth, Orbiter nose parallel to the velocity
vector
7
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4.0 REQUIREMENTS AND CONSTRAINTS
The following requirements and constraints are understood to apply during eleva-
tion of the IUS/TDRS from the payload bay:
a. While the tilt table is in motion, the Orbiter may either be under VRCS con-
trol or in free drift. Active attitude control using the PRCS while the tilt
table is in motion is not permitted.
2
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b. When the TDRS is elevated in the Orbiter, it shall be shadowed from the Sun
by the Orbiter or be in the eclipse of the Earth.
c. With the tilt table up, the Orbiter is to avoid attitudes that permit
Orbiter radiators to reflect solar radiation onto the IUS.
d. The airborne support equipment (ASE) erects at approximately 0.1 deg/sec.
Total time is approximately 280 seconds for 29 degrees of travel.
In addition, the following operations requirements were derived from the flight
planning activity:
a
a. The nominal ground elapsed time (GET) to elevate the TDRS/IUS 29 degrees out
of the payload bay is about 9 hours.
b. The TDRS is to be elevated for activation of its transmitter over the ground
spacecraft tracking and data networks (GSTDN).
r
c. Launch window constraints dictate that 9 hours GET be a daylight environment.
5.0 NOMINAL TIMELINE
In order to investigate what adverse effects, if any, result from having to ele-
vate the TDRS/IUS without ARCS control, the nominal (baseline) TDRS timeline was
utilized. This timeline calls for the Orbiter to maneuver from Z local vertical
(ZLV) to deployment attitude just after 8 hours 50 minutes GET, which estab-
lishes a solar protection (Orbiter-shadowing) attitude for TDRS. This attitude
maneuver is then followed by elevation of the TDRS/IUS configuration to 29
degrees. Predicated on using the Hawaii GSTDN pass at 9 hours 15 minutes GET to
activate the TDRS transmitter and based on the present constraint that the TDRS
must be elevated prior to turning on the transmitter, the 9-hour GET reflects ap-
proximately the latest time to plan elevation to 29 degrees. Additionally, in
the interest of minimizing the time the TDRS spacecraft must be exposed to the
environment during elevation, and also with consideration given to initializing
and verifying the activation of the IUS guidance computer prior to elevation,
the 8-hour 50-minute GET is approximately the earliest time for elevation. This
allows the Indian Ocean ground station (IOS) (with Hawaii as a backup) to uplink
the ground-determined state vector to the Orbiter, which in turn will be
transferred to the IUS.
k
With regard to maneuvering the TDRS/IUS from 29 degrees to the ejection position
of 58 degrees, the IUS power budget must be considered; this budget is based on
switching to internal IUS power no later than 10 minutes prior to ejection.
Since the umbilical is pulled during this phase of the erection process,
dictating that the IUS be on internal power prior to final elevation sequence,
the elevation to 58 degrees should nominally not be planned earlier than 10
minutes prior to deployment.
Based on the TDRS launch window, the above tilt-table elevation activities -
both from 0 to 29 degrees and from 29 to 58 degrees will occur during
daylight, which will necessitate protection from the Sun during elevation.
3
80FM50
6,0 ANALYSIS
The position of the Sun relative to the Orbiter was generated assuming that the
Orbiter will be in deployment attitude under PROS control prior to elevation of
the tilt table, and also that the PRCS is inhibited and the Orbiter placed in
free drift at the time elevation is initiated. Figures 1(a) through 1(e) illus-
trate a typical time history of Sun location relative to the Orbiter body for
various assumed initial drift rates, positions, and orientations of the TDRS.
For this assessment, the PRCS deadband residual rates at inhibition of the FRCS
were assumed to be 0.1 deg/sec/axis, although it is recognized that the current
guaranteed minimum rate is 0.2 deg/sec/axis. The 01 deg/sac/axis rate was
ascertained to be adequate to establish trends and to identify concerns. There
also appears to be a feeling that the Orbiter would potentially stabilize at a
deadband rate less than 0.2 deg/sec/axis, given sufficient time. Therefore, the
0.1 deg/see/axis was investigated in order to avoid being overly pessimistic at
the outset with knowledge that the higher deadband rate of 0.2 deg/sec/axis
would tend to make the results even worse.
It should be noted that the simulation only considered an initial attitude and
a set of attitude rates, which then were acted on by gravity gradient torques.
The fact was not considered that as the tilt table is being raised the Orbiter
will experience an attitude excursion. It is estimated that for the cash where
the Orbiter begins with an inertial rate of zero deg/sec/axis, the Orbiter atti-
tude would only be changed on the order of about 1 to 2 degrees during the time
period that the IUS/TDRS is elevated through a 58-degree angle, Moving the tilt
table at 0.1 deg/see/axis would induce an Orbiter pitch rate of less than 0.01
deg/sec, which is an order of magnitude less than the assumed initial rate.
Four sets of initial attitude rates were investigated. Case A in figures 1(a)
through 1(e) reflects the ideal situation of beginning with a zero deg/sec/axis
deadband at the time the Orbiter initiates free drift. Case H reflects a posi-
tive pitch rate of 0,1 deg/sec with zero deg/see in yaw and roll at the time
free drift is initiated. Inasmuch as the deployment attitude requires the Sun
to be behind and below the Orbiter at an angle of 58 degrees relative to the
Orbiter X-axis, a positive pitch would result in the payload bay being exposed
to the Sun in the shortest amount of time.. An initial negative (nose down)
pitch rate would require the Orbiter to rotate through an additional, 64 de-
grees to have the Orbiter payload bay facing in the same direction relative
to the Sun as a positive (nose up) pitch. Case G assumes initial attitude
rates of 0.1 deg/sec in all axes while case D assumes a deadband rate of
0.1 deg/sec existing in yaw and roll only.
The Sun trajectories, with respect to the Orbiter body axis for each of the four
initial conditions described above, are plotted in figures 1(a) through 1(e);
they are the same in each figure. The difference between figures 1(a) and 1(e)
is the blockage provided by the Orbiter for reference points on the TDRS at vari-
ous elevated positions.
Despite the fact that the body blockage is dynamic while the TDRS./IUS is being
elevated, and in the absence of the availability of a modes. to predict the
e
, V.
8OPM50
instantaneous body blockage relative to the solar vector, figures 1(a) through
1(e) assume that the body blockage remains static for the time interval under
consideration,
Referring to figures 1(a) and 1(b) (stowed cargo configuration), which typify
the maximum shadowing afforded by the Orbiter, it is seen that the cargo element
will be exposed to a Sun environment for no longer than approximately 5 minutes
(case C), which is the approximate nominal length of time required to raise the
tilt table. Figures 1(e) and 1(d) show that the payload could be exposed to
the Sun in about 4 minutes, Assuming that for short-term intervals the atti-
tude time history can be scaled by the initial attitude rate, it appears then
that a 0.2 deg/see/axis deadband rate would result in violation of the solar con-
straints from 2 to 2.5 minutes after the Orbiter is placed in free drift.
Assuming that the elevation was initiated immediately, this time would equate to
about midway through the process of elevating to 29 degrees,
Figure 1(e) shows the potential Sun shadow that exists when the TDRS /IUS is
elevated to the ejection position at 58 degrees. It is seen for this configura-
tion that case C results in daylight exposure in about 2.5 minutes; the higher
0.2 deg/sec rate could be expected to result in solar exposure in about 1
minute.
Figure 2 shows, for information purposes, the time history of the Sun position
relative to the stowed thermal, constraints of the TDRS. (These constraints are
the current constraints contained in the TDRS payload integration plan (PIP) and
are mapped as a pitch/yaw rather than roll/pitch). Since these solar exposure
constraints apply to a stowed configuration, and since the present constraint is
for no solar impingement when elevated, it appears reasonable to assume that the
Limits during the elevation process (at least from 0 to 29 degrees) will either
be zero or betwaen zero and the time limits shown in figure 2. From figure 2,
the following observations can be made:
a. Independent of whether the tilt table is being elevated or in fact remains
stowed, the TDRS thermal constraints appear to limit the time in an un-
controlled free drift. Case D illustrates that less than 15 minutes of
free draft time is available; for 0.2 deg/see/axis rate, it is reasonable to
expect a significant decrease in available time. (Since case C traverses
many thermal constraints boundaries, it is difficult to assess exactly when
the thermal constraint is violated, although perhaps the limit is 10 minutes
after free drift is initiated).
b. Past discussions have implied the possibility that the tilt table is moving
at a rate slower than 0,1 deg/sec. It seems unlikely that the TDRS (and per-
haps even the IUS) can tolerate elevation time longer than 5 minutes, which
results from elevation rates slower than about 0.1 deg/see, without active
attitude control.
In fact, at 0.1 deg/sec elevation rate, the STS also loses the flexibility to el-
evate from a stowed configuration directly to 58 degrees (without stopping).
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7.0 ASSESSMENT
From the previous discussion, it appears that the STS may not be able to support
elevating the TDRS/IUS under the conditions of a failed VRCS and a 0.2 deg/sec/axis
FRCS deadband without impact to procedures and/or timeline. This section
attempts to identify and assess some potential options for solving the problem
of elevating the TDRS/IUS with failed verniers.
7.1 OPTION 1: ELEVATE DURING DARKNESS
The obvious candidate solution for elevation of the 'EARS/IUS when the VRCS has
failed is to utilize a darkness pass for e3evati.on. In a generic sense (totally
separated from any other integrated operational consideration), this strategy
would allow the elevation to occur without need of concern for violating the
TDRS or IUS thermal constraints and would impose no constraint on Orbiter atti-
tude prior to or during elevation; it then follows that the initial drift rates
resulting from PRCS deadband would not be of concern. (This observation presup-
poses that the elevation process can be accomplished within one darkness pans -
approximately 33 to 35 minutes. There is no information that indicates
otherwise.) This implementation concept must be evaluated in context of the
integrated set of activities that must be supported and the trajectory/
environment opportunities that occur for this flight.
7.1.1 Elevation to 29 Degrees
If the VRCS fails early in the flight (prior to nominal time of elevation),
there is potentially some flexibility (and its associated implications) as to
when the tilt table can be raised to 29 degrees. Based upon the fact that the
IUS must be in a stowed configuration for the star scan, the star scan must es-
sentially occur during darkness for TDRS thermal protection; the realistic time
of launch for TDRS-A will occur in the afternoon ( 19:35 GMT). The opportuni-
ties associated with nighttime elevation of the tilt table prior to nominal
deployment opportunity are approximately 6:20 to 6:35 GET, 7:50 to 8:25 GET, and
9:20 to 9:55 GET. In addition, the opportunity associated with the ascending
node, taking into consideration a second star scan and the crew work/rest sched-
ule, would be 22:55 to 23:25 GET.
7.1.1.1 6:20 to 6.55 GET Opportunity
The 6:20 to 6:55 GET darkness pass for elevation to 29 degrees is not
recommended when the VRCS fails. This time period occurs in the midst of the
groundtracking activity for orbit determination; since an attitude maneuver
would be required to achieve a thermal protection attitude after elevation and
prior to sunrise, degradation in the accuracy of thA state vector would be
expected to occur. While the exact effect of this maneuver has not been
evaluated relative to state vector accuracy (to a limited degree the amount of
PRCS thrusting can be controlled by maneuvering at the slowest possible rates,
i.e., nontime-critical), it is undesirable to be maneuvering during this
6
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period of gathering data. A quiescent Orbiter (in terms of maneuvering) is pre-
ferred in order not to corrupt the tracking measurements made prior to the maneu-
ver. There appears to be no advantage to elevating thn TDRS /IUS at this opportu-
nity other than that it provides enough time so as not to A,.nterfere with other
mandatory activities; hence, the capability for nominal doployment is retained.
On the other handy utilization of the nighttime elevation opportunity suggests
the following:
a. Assuming that the tilt table has no capability for multiple erection, commit-
ment to a descending node opportunity will be required without the IUS state
vector transfer having been made and verified. (Currently this activity is
planned to nominally occur ever IUS at above 8:35 CET?. In other words, the
flexibility for utilizing the ascending deployment opportunity would be
sacrificed with a mayor checkout operation outstanding that is over and
above the requirement for the nominal plan. (Currently TDRS/IUS design re-
quires that the TDRS/IUS be elevated for turning on the TDRS transmitter and
for transferring the TDRS tc IUS internal power.
b. To support the total set of descending node opportunities, the IUS/TDRS
would need to remain elevated for between 6 and 7 hours (in deployment
attitude). Taking the proposed TDRS revision to the thermal constraints
(presented at the April 1980 STS/TDRS Interface Working Croup) as 130
minutes of sleep space viewing and 5.5 hours in deployment attitude for a
24.5-hour stay in the Orbiter, at appears (subject to TDRS verification)
that the 7•-hour elevation ti.mo r,in be attained at the expense of an
estimated 2-hour reduction in Orbiter stay time (22,5-hour maximum), a 1-
hour reduction in deep space viewing (70-minute maximum) or some combination
of the above, such as a resultant capabi.iity of 24 hours in the bay and 85
minutes of deep space facing. The multiple erection problem presently makes
this concern a moot point since the ascending node capability is not
required after the TDRS/IUS is once elevated. If the multiple erection, capa-
bility were available, all deployment opportunities in all likelihood still
Gould not be achieved; the ascending node would require an additional 1 hour
(minimum) of time in the elevated position, which further reduces the
Orbiter stay time and deep space capability. Preserving the deep space capa-
bility would decrease the stay time by an additional 1.3 hours, and the opti-
mum deployment would need to be one orbit early.
c. A 2- to 2.5-hour gap would exist in the nominal timeline that could not be
supported with this elevation opportunity. (This represents 22 to 28 per-
cent of the time to nominal elevation.) It would then appear reasonable to
assume that this gap is large enough to warrant designing the contingency
strategy to handle a VRCS failure during this last 2- to 2.5-hour timeframe
on an equal probability with earlier failure occurrences (this assumption is
certainly debatable). Since the foregoing assumption leads to designing for
a later failure occurrence, there is no identified reason to hurvy
elevation.
7
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7.1,1.2 7:50 to 8:25 CET Opportunity
The 7:50 to 8;25 CET darkness pass for elevation to 29 degrees is the ;Last oppor-
tunity to elevate to 29 degre ,^ ^'. in darkness prior to the nominal elevation time;
consequently, this may be the last opportunity to elevate the IU.S/TDRS in
darkness and still meet the nominal deployment time. The same considerations
apply to this opportunity as discussed for the 6;20 to 6:55 CET opportunity, al-
though in some instances the significance of the particular implication may be
altered.
a. First and foremost, elevation at this time requires a commitment to the
descending mode with the same reservations and implications as previously
discussed for the 6:20 to 6:55 GET opportunity; i.e., no state vector trans-
fer check. It appears that the risk associated with committment to a
descending node opportunity without the state vector transfer can be reduced
by nominally planning to check out the capability for state vector transfer
early in the flight (this strategy also would be available for the 6:20 to
6:55 opportunity). By doing this check early, confidence that the system is
working is gained and, therefore, all that remains prior to deployment is
an uplink of the actual state vector to be used by the IUS guidance, naviga-
tion, and control (CN&C). This early check does not have any impact be-
cause the present flight profile concept entails performing orbit trim maneu-
vers that also require ground tracking and orbit determination processing.
b. Similar to the discussion pertaining to the earlier darkness opportunity, an
attitude maneuver is required to achieve the deployment attitude after eleva-
tion and prior to orbital sunrise. The difference between this opportunity
and the 6:20 to 6:65 CET opportunity is that this maneuver occurs after the
tracking has been completed rather than in the middle of the tracking pe-
riod, Since the nominal. timeline also requires an attitude maneuver after
the state vector has been generated, the additional degradation in state
vector accuracy at deployment time is attributable to an additional 25 to 60
minutes of propagation. In the past a star scan had originally been planned
during this timeframe to satisfy the then thought-to-be requirements. In
spite of the fact that the star scan entailed stgnificantl.y more maneuvering
than would be required to simply reach the deployment attitude in a lei-
surely fashion (as proposed here), it is logical to expect that the ability
to meet geosynchronous orbit insertion conditions are not compromised for
the nominal deployment opportunity. This is based on the fact that the
state vector accuracy associated with the aforementioned star scan was deter-
mined by Boeing to be acceptable. The effect of the one-orbit deployment
delay on accuracy needs to be assessed; the two-orbit deployment delay is
not necessarily affected since present plans depend on additional track-
ing and another state vector uplink.
e. To support the compl.eLe set of descending node deployment opportunities, it
is neoessary to elevate the tilt table for approximately 5 hours; an addi-
tional hour of elevation time is required to support a sequential ascending
node deployment. Although the multiple erection capability currently poses
a problem for the ascending node deployment (as previously discussed) this
elevation opportunity at the very worst should be on the margin of thermal
capability to satisfy the ascending deployment opportunity.
8
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d. A 30- to 60-minute gap exists in the nominal timeline during which] if the
VRCS railed, this elevation opportunity could not support. "_'hire 1epre3ents
only 6 to 11 percent of the time to elevation. The probability of a failure
occurring in this last 30 to 60 minutes is small, perhaps tc the point that
consideration of failure during the last hour prior to nominal elevation is
not preplanned but treated on a real time basis.
7.1.1.3 9:20 to 9:55 GET Opportunity
This darkness pass represents both the last opportunity to elevate the tilt
table prior to nominal deployment and the first opportunity to elevate (or com-
plete the elevation) if the VRCS fails between sunrise of the orbit on which a
29-degree elevation is to occur and nominal completion of the elevation process,
As the requirements and constraints are presently defined, a concern evolves as
to whether the nominal deployment time can be met while using this elevation op-
portunity. However, if the TDRS/IUS system has more capability than has
previously been assumed, there are some potential advantages to using this 9:20
to 9:55 GET darkness period, not only for the failed VRCS situation but also for
this nominal timeline. This opportunity is assessed as follows.
a. Under the present constraint that the TDRS must be elevated prior to turning
on the transmitter, delaying elevation to 9:20 CET (darkness) could in gen-
eral mean essentially missing the Hawaii pass for turning on the transmitter
as is now nominally planned. This would necessitate relying solely on
Santiago if activation has to be performed over a station; consequently, the
operations for activation of the transmitter and making a go/no-go decision
for nominal deployment become vulnerable to a station pass (Santiago) that
may be sub j ect to potential reduced coverage and communications dropout be-
cause of a combination of trajectory dispersions, stationmasking, and key-
hole effects. Therefore, to maximize the TDRS antenna coverage over
Santiago (in the event of PIP failure), prudence would dictate that the
Orbiter fly the landmark tracking attitude mode. This activity, in turn,
leads one to question whether the remainder of the deployment operations can
indeed be performed in time to meet the nominal opportunity. With less than
an absolute maximum of 20 minutes available between Santiago loss-of-signal
and IUS deployment, this is considered extremely risky. It therefore ap-
pears extremely undesirable (if not infeasible) to plan for the 9:20 to 9:55
CET darkness period for elevating the tilt table, followed in succession by
turning on the transmitter, elevation to 58 degrees, and subsequent nominal
deployment. With the above factors, deployment is felt to require at least
a one-orbit slip,
b. Even if the nominal deployment opportunity could be met, the plan associated
wicn ensuring radio frequency (RF) coverage between GSTDN (Santiago) and the
TLRS omni introduces potential velocity increments to the actual state
vector. Depending on the capability of performance of the IUS navigation
system, additional inaccuracies of the initialized IUS state vector may he
experienced. Results from previous parking orbit state vector accuracy
analyses did not Consider this landmark tracking hvpothesis prior to
deployment. Therefore, it is not desirable to intentionally create degraded
9
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IUS guidance data as dictated by using this darkness pass for elevation
under the current constraints.
c. This opportunity imposes no impact upon the TDRS thermal capability; in
fact, the cime during elevation decreases by about 20 to 30 minutes.
d. Elevation during this 9:20 to 9:55 GET darkness pass covers VRCS failure
occurring up to essentially the nominal deployment opportunity. This, in
turn, allows the IUS G&N state vector initialization function to be
performed and verified before elevation and before committing to the
descending node deployment opportunity-.
e. In reviewing the above advantages and disadvantages a,soeiated with this op-
portunity, it is evident that thermal and station coverage requirements for
turning on the TDRS transmitter is the driving factor that makes this oppor-
tunity unattractive. If, on the other hand, the TDRS had the capability to
tolerate the transmitter operating while in the stowed configuration for a
period of about 10 to 15 minutes, this opportunity for elevation would be
recommended - not only for a failed VRCS but also for the nominal timeline.
The Hawaii. pass acquisition where the transmitter is nominally planned to be
turned on occurs at about 9:15 GET. A proposed plan is to turn on the transmit-
ter while it is stowed during this pass. After loss of signal at the Hawaii sta-
tion or sunset - whichever is latest - elevation of the tilt table is initiated.
Preliminary analysis (to be published at a later date) indicates that Hawaii
will appear in the TDRS omni field of view for 1 to 2 minutes in the stowed con-
figuration and in ZLV attitude. Therefore, a GSTDN to TDRS omni RF link ia- also
available as well as the PI-to-TDRS link. Also, continuous coverage with the
IUS omni is for contingency RF commanding available to the IUS. This contrasts
a maximum of approximately 30 seconds TDRS omni coverage with the current scheme
of elevating before turning on the transmitter. This contrast is caused by the
differences in the reqa'4'red Orbiter attitude for each implementation scheme.
Thus, all checkout activities (except the switching of TDRS source power from
the Orbiter to IUS, which is performed onboard) are performed prior to elevation
of the tilt table.
.1.1.4 22:55 to 23:30 GET Opportunity
For the ascending node deployment opportunity, constraining elevation of the
tilt table (occurring during this darkness pass) ;should have minimal impact to
the present conceived timeline. The present timeline envisions elevation to 29
degrees about 1 hour prior to deployment; i.e., 23:00 GET (essentially the end
of the darkness). To ensure elevation during darkness with sufficient time
thereafter to attain deployment attitude prior to sunrise, the conservative ap-
proach is to begin elevation at sunset, or 35 minutes earlier than is currently
being employed. It does riot appear that this plan would conflict with any pres-
ently identified trajectory-constrained activity. In real time, a determination
would have to be made as to whether TDRS thermal constraints are violated as a
result of this'ncreased 35 minutes of elevation time.
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7.1.2 Elevation to 58 Degrees
The time to elevate from the 29- to 58-degree position is primarily governed by
the battery life of the IUS and the fact that the umbilicals will be pulled as
the T DRS/IUS configuration rotates through this 29 degrees. Hence, the only op-
tion available in selection of a time to elevate to 58 degrees for obtaining com-
patibility with a darkness pass is potentially small timing changes relative to
deployment. The parking orbit can be assumed to be stationary With respect to
the Sun for purposes of assessing the daylight/darkness occurrence relative to
the deployment opportunities. Therefore, the feasibility of employing nightaide
passes for elevation to 58 degrees need only be assessed in terms of whether the
deployment opportunity is for a descending or ascending node. The current
Boeing submittal to the flight planning annex indicates a maximum capability of
438 minutes from the time the power is transferred to IUS/TDRS Stage I batteries
until TDRS separation from the IUS; the December 6, 1979 Flight Operations Sum-
mary indicates that the nominal deployment opportunity (transfer to internal
power a4 9:54 GET) requires about 428 minutes of battery capability. For pres-
ent discussion purposes this implies that an approximately 10-minute margin
exists for capability to control the elevation time relative to darkness. The
time indicated above is not meant to imply that this is the current IUS power
margin nor that it is necessarily a margin at all; that problem will be for
Boeing to define. It is only included to establish a rough order of magnitude
of the capability/constraint limit that should be considered.
7.1.2.1 Descending Node Deployment Opportunity
For the nominal deployment opportunity, the present 51-minute coast time dic-
tates that ejection occur at about 10:04 GET, that power be switched from the
Orbiter to IUS internal power 10 minutes prior (9:54 GET), and that the tilt
table elevation to 58 degrees be initiated at about 9:57 GET.
In order to use darkness for elevation of the tilt table to 58 degrees, the
switching to IUS internal power, the physical elevation from 29 degrees to 58
degrees, configuring the tilt table for PRCS operations, and finally using the
PRCS to maneuver back to deployment attitude must all occur before sunrise. It
thon becomes evident that, in general, the capability to elevate in darkness to
56 degrees will depend on three major parameters	 the launch time (window), the
time required to do the preceding activities, and the potential additional IUS
power requirements and existing IUS capabilities. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) illus-
trate the variation in sunrise time as a function of lift-off time and time of
year. (While the indicated GET addresses sunset/sunrise relative to the nominal
deployment opportunity, the data could have been shown as time prior to solid
rocket motor (SRM) -1 ignition and would have applied to all the approved
descending node deployment opportunities).
To cover what is felt to be the probable TDRS
of the day of the year ( 1900 to 2100 GMT
and 10:02 GET (66 minutes to 53 minutes prior
the current recommended liftoff time of 1935
occurring between about 9:55 and 10:00 GET or
SRM-1. If it is assumed that (a) the nominal
launch window that is independent
, sunrise could vary between 9:49
to SRM-1 ignition, respectively);
GMT would result in sunrise
between 55 and 60 minutes prior to
relative time between switching to
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IUS internal power and initiation of tilt table elevation to 58 degrees is to be
retained at 3 mir.rutes, (b) the maximum time to elevate the tilt table from 29 to
58 degrees in the worst case will not exceed 5 minutes, and (c) if approximately
7 minutes were to be budgeted to secure the tilt table at 58 degrees and maneu-
ver to deployment attitude (1 minute configuration activities plus a 180-degree
maneuver at 0.5 deg/sec), the worst case (2100 GMT) would require about 81
minutes on IUS internal power prior to deployment. (If the option exists to con-
strain the launch window closing to no later than 2000 GMT, the worst case time
would decrease to 76 minutes on IUS power). For the preferred 1935 GMT lift-off
time, between 70 and 75 minutes would be required. It has previously been
identified at the TDRS cargo integration review (CIR) that 67 minutes between
deployment and SRM-1 ignition was needed due to Orbiter performance considera-
tions for the ascending node opportunity, which would translate into being on
IUS internal power for 77 minutes prior to SRM-1 ignition. At the time, IUS
engineers concurred that this capability was available, and at present the Mis-
sion Planning and Analysis Division (MPAD) has submitted a change to the IUS ad-
dendum that establishes that the time between deployment and SRM-1 ignition be
between 46 and 67 minutes.
Based on the previous facts, the following observations are presented:
a., If the IUS capability to support 67 minutes between deployment and SRM-1 ig-
nition exists or can be obtained - either nominally or by contingency proce-
dures and flight rules - darkness passes can be used to elevate the tilt
table for descending node deployment opportunities.
b. To meet the nominal deployment opportunity under failed VRCS conditions, op-
erations associated with elevating to 58 degrees would likely preclude the
use of Santiago for TDRS transmitter activation or as a go/no-go site for
deployment prior to elevating to 58 degrees.
Under the timing assumptions previously made for activities such as
switching to internal power, physically elevating the tilt table etc., the
initialization of the elevation to 58 degrees could occur as early as 9:37
GET; this time is based on a 2100 GMT and occurs 3 to 5 minutes prior to
Santiago acquisition of signal (AOS). For a 1935 GMT launch, this time
could be between 9:43 and 9:48 GET, which would occur somewhere between AOS
and loss-of-signal (LOS). It seems reasonable to visualize that the go/no-
go for nominal deployment should be given over Hawaii. If for some reason
that 4ecision has not been made, then the deployment would be delayed.
c. There is some flexibility in controlling the minimum time from switching to
internal power to the time the IUS/TDRS can be ejected. Basically, 6
minutes have been budgeted to maneuver to deployment attitude. This was
based on a 180 deg/0.5 deg/see/maneuver rate. If the required maneuver
angle is smaller or a larger maneuver rate is employed, the time can be
reduced. It, should be cautioned, however, that the larger maneuver rate may
produce more degradation in the IUS state vector accuracy and will require
additional propellant.
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d. Elevation from 29 to 58 degree * Mould have to be compatible with elevation
from the stowed configuration to 29 degrees if it is determined that eleva-
"	 tion to 29 degrees should occur during the 9:20 to 9:55 GET opportunity. In
effect, one darkness pas* would need to support both elevation phases.
Assuming the latest time to begin elevation to 29 degrees would occur at
9:25 GET (Hawaii AOS + 10 minutes) and 5 minutes to actually elevate to 29
degrees, the earliest that the switeh to int_rn41 power can occur is 9:30
GET. Considering elevation to 29 degrees vllid olo.vatio:, to 58 degrees to-
gether, it appears that an operational launch ^-Instra nt of between 1900 and
2200 GMT is derived.
7.1.2.2 Ascending Node Deployment Opportunity
For the current TDRS -A launch window, elevating the tilt table to 58 degrees dur-
ing darkness is not feasible without significant impact to the IUS power require -
ments. SRM-1 ignition for the ascending node deployment opportunity will occur
in the neighborhood of 25:10 GET. Ejection time will then be between 24:03 GET
(for a 67-minute coast between deployment and SRM-1 ignition) and 24:24 GET (for
the absolute minimum 46-minute coast time). Assuming the 15 -minute pre-
deployment activities previously discussed, switching to IUS internal power
would be initiated at 23:48 to 24:00 GET with 23:51 to 24:12 GET being the
latest time that elevation to 58 degrees could be initiated. Figure 4 ( b) shl)ws
the variation in sunrise/sunset time as a function of lift-off time and time of
year. It is seen that for the expected TDRS launch window and the recommended
1935 GMT lift-off time, the above GET's occur in a daylight environment. To
achieve a nightside pas.j would require elevation to 58 degrees at a minimum of
12 minutes prior to the preceding sunrise, which could necessitate being on IUS
internal power as long as 2 hours prior to SRM - 1 ignition. This is considered
to be an unacceptable demand. In addition, were this to be a viable option, it
would require that the initial elevation to 29 degrees occur early during this
same darkness pass, as both elevation phases appear to be competing for the same
darkness opportunity. Thus, it is concluded that nighttime elevation for the
ascending node deployment is not a feasible solution to the problem of loss of
VRCS capability.
7.2 OPTION 2: CONTROL ORBITER, ATTITUDE EXCURSION WITH INTERRUPTIONS
DURING THE ELEVATION SEQUENCE
A second option theoretically available for elevating the tilt table with failed
VRCS is to control the Orbiter attitude excursion during the elevation process
by interrupting the tilt-table sequence and performing maneuvers to re-establish
the desired ( solar protection) attitude. Conceptually, this might be accom-
plished by monitoring the Orbiter attitude errors during the free -drift eleva-
tion process; whenever these attitude errors reached a pre-established limit,
the crew would stop the tilt table at the current position, apply the "brakes"
or otherwise configure the tilt table for PROS operation, and then, using the
PRCS, maneuver back to the original attitude. Figure 4 illustrates this con-
cept. Disregarding the tilt -table acceleration/deceleration phase,, the tilt-
table elevation angle time history is shown for the 0.1 deg /sec rate.
Nominally, this is a continuous event from the time that elevation is initiated
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until it travels 29 degrees. It is seen from figure 4 how typically the tim
history of the tilt table would be affected by having to periodically readjust
the Orbiter sttitude. The frequency of the attitude corrections will be
governed by the dynamics of the Orbiter/tilt-table system, Sun position and re-
lated Orbiter attitude, Orbiter shadowing, and by the attitude deadband rates
existing at the time of FRCS inhibition prior to each elevation segment. The
required attitude maneuver(s) would occur each time the Orbiter attitude error
limit is reached, and the duration of the pause between tilt table elevation
activities will be dependent upon the attitude error that needs to be corrected
and the rate at which the maneuver is performed. The following observations aro
made relative to this option:
a. The time required to complete elevation through a total rotation angle of 29
degrees may be increased significantly above the nominal time to elevate. Of
equal or even greater significance is the fact that the total time is unpre-
dictable due to the present uncertain and random nature of the contributing
sources. To realistically implement this concept, a statistical analysis
and simulation is required to determine the expected time variation
(typically (7 ). The initiation of the elevation process is then scheduled at
a time which ensures no interference (under the worst credible situation to
be considered) with activities following the elevation process. It is impos-
sible to assess the impact of this operation in a generic sense other than
the obvious potential power impact if the elevation time requires longer
than 10 minutes (from 29 to 58 degrees) and timeline impact to the current
nominal if the duration requires more than about 15 minutes, i.e., elevating
to 29 degrees in time to meet the Hawaii pass at 9:15 GET.
b. Significant quantity of additional RCS propellant would be required to be
budgeted. The precise ACS usage would be based on the frequency of
corrections, the maneuver rate and timing requirements and constraints. The
time required to perform these operations can be reduced at the expense of
additional propellant. It should be noted that these maneuvers would re-
quire the FRCS for both starting ana stopping the attitude rates. Under the
worst possible conditions, a maximum of two 29-degree elevation phases would
be required.
c. The state vector accuracy is likely to be significantly degraded by virtue
of the maneuvering required. Again, it is impossible at present to quantify
the impact in a generic sense. An important item to remember is that there
is no additional groundtracking that will improve the accuracy for the nomi-
nal and one-orbit late deployment opportunity.
d. An analysis would have to be performed to determine these preflight attitude
error limits.
e. It is understood that in the manual direct rotation pulse command mode, a ca-
pability may exist to control rates to within 0.04 to 0.06 deg/see with the
PROS. Therefore, before the elevation is initiated, it would seem prudent
to plan to trim the attitude rates to within this capability. If the ini-
tial rate can be reduced to about 0.05 deg/see (a; reduction factor of four
in the advertised 0.2 deg/sec deadband) the number of subsequent corrections
may very likely be reduced by virtue of the fact that the attitude error
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limit would tako longer time to exceed initially. Subsequent analysis may
even show that under 3a oonditions, elevation through a 29-degree angle
would require no interruption. Procedures would need to be developed and
simulations performed to establish the minimum limit to which the Orbiter at-
titude rates could be controlled and the time required to achieve these
conditions. It is assumed that the timeline would be biased to accommodate
this attitude rate trim prior to elevation. If residual attitude Headband
rates in the vicinity of 0.04 to 0.06 deg /see can be achieved rapidly by
procedures,
	 Yusing menus]. res it may very well be performed after eaoh interrup
tion for attitude maneuvers; otherwise, timing considerations may make this
procedure only applicable immediately prior to initiation of each elevation
phase; i.e., 0 to 29 degrees and 29 to 58 degrees.
Y
7.3 OPTION 3 CONTROL ORBITER ATTITUDE RATES DURING ELEVATION
This option basically assumes that the Orbiter attitude and attitude rates are
controlled during the elevation process. Conceptually, it is assumed that the
PRCS could be configured to fire selected jets in the manual direct rotation
pulse mode as discussed in. section 7.2. Strict interpretation of the constraint
that the PRCS not be fired during elevation would exclude this alternative; how-
ever, being unaware of the PRCS operational model and the hypothetical condi-
tions that went into defining the above constraint, thi:i option is offered in
the event that it has not been previously considered or evaluated for feasibil-
ity. Intuitively, this concept would seem to be simpler than option 2, have
more complex procedures than option 1 although potentially it would possess less
v'	 timeline and flight design impact and have no more of an IUS/TDRS system impact
than either of the other two. However, man-in-loop simulations involving the dy-
namics of elevating the tilt table appear to be required for assessment of this
option.
8.0 CONCLUDING REMARKS
The following summarizes the observations resulting from the analysis and assess-
ment of elevating the tilt table with the VRCS failed:
a. The PRCS deadband of 0.2 deg/sec appears incompatible with preserving the
TDRS thermal constraints when elevating in daylight without special flight
procedures development. This may also apply to a 0.1 deg/see deadband. The
feasibility of developing such procedures and the attendant flight design
and timeline ramifications would need to be assessed.
b. PRCS attitude deadband and TDRS thermal constrai nts
 are not a consideration
if elevation can be planned to occur during darkness.
c. Elevation to the 29-degree position can be scheduled to occur dining
darkness.
d. Elevation to the 58-degree position to support a descending node deployment
opportunity during darkness is feasible if the launch can be constrained be-
tween 1900 and 2100 GMT, and the IUS can support being on internal power for
15
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77 to 80 minutes prior to SRM-1 ignition. The launch window implication is
not believed to be a factor for TDRS-A, and the power implication may be
borderline.
e. Elevation to 58 degrees du ring darkness to support the ascending node
deployment is not believed a viable alternative. Special procedures will
need to be developed or a program directive issued that eliminates the
ascending node opportunity if the VRCS fails.
f. Whether or not sj.)ci.al procedures are developed to support the TDRS specifi-
cally, the principle of controlling Orbiter attitude and rate deadband with
failed VRCS may have other applications and may be worthwhile to develop as
a generic capability. This is obviously a Flight Operation Directorate
decision.
g, For the descending node deployment opportunity, it is recommended that the
present timeline be changed so as not to initiate elevation of the tilt
table to 29 degrees earlier than 9:25 GET (approximately darkness for the
time of day of launch being considered). The details of this proposed
timeline change will be documented in a forthcoming memorandum with the
associated proposed PIP changes.
h. As a result of this assessment, it is recommended that all plans be oriented
towards making a go/no-go decision during the Hawaii. pass at 9:15 GET and
that consideration be given to delaying elevation of the tilt table and
delaying deployment, if such a decision is not received.
i. In concurrence with item (g) above, the state vector transfer function as-
sessment should be performed well before to the IOS uplink of the final
state vector for IUS flight execution. Planning should be developed which
minimizes IUS real time assessment requirements for the IOS pass and later
passes.
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Figure 3.- Sunrise/sunset time variations throughout the year
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Figure 3.- Concluded.
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